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Over the last three decades, Iran has been a prominent feature of the world press and global media.  Not a week has passed 
since November 4, 1979 — when 52 
American diplomats were taken hostage 
in Tehran — without the clerical govern-
ment being captured in the international 
spotlight. The near-daily news about the 
hostage situation, the Iran-Iraq War, and 
Washington’s Iran-Contra fiasco were 
followed by reports of alleged terrorist 
bombings in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Ar-
gentina and Africa, along with dispatches 
about assassinations of political dissidents 
and critics at home and abroad.  Later on, 
attention was focused on political mischief 
in Iraq and Afghanistan involving U.S. 
and NATO forces, as well as increasing 
political repression and human-rights 
violations at home.   Then, reports about 
clandestine uranium enrichment and 
nuclear development programs, subse-
quent UN Security Council sanctions, 
and other multilateral or unilateral penal-
ties became headline news. And, lately, 
extensive reports about an alleged terrorist 
plan to assassinate the Saudi ambassador 
in Washington, the storming of the British 
embassy in Tehran by a shadowy group 
presumably angered by the Cameron gov-
ernment’s sanctions on Iran, the downed 
U.S. Sentinel stealth drone in northeastern 
Iran, and Tehran’s threat to close the straits 
of Hormuz in case of total embargo on 
Iran’s oil exports have supplied the raven-
ous international media with continuous, 
and at times sensational, material. 
 Despite this nearly ceaseless publicity, 
however, some fundamental characteristics 
of the Islamic regime have escaped proper 
scrutiny and are shrouded in myth. The 
regime’s true political nature, the country’s 
constitutional structure, the power and po-
sition of its top leaders, the political chal-
lenges it poses to the region and the world, 
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the reasons for its long-term viability in the 
face of stiff global sanctions, and its ideo-
logical influence on the region’s political 
movements remain largely misunderstood 
and misinterpreted.  This brief review at-
tempts to dispel seven of these myths.   
(1) The Islamic Republic is one of the 
Middle East’s vibrant democracies, 
since it holds regular elections for its 
office holders.
 This is not only an exaggeration; it is 
essentially misleading. The Islamic gov-
ernment has, since its inception in 1979, 
held regular periodic elections for its major 
elective offices — the presidency, the Ma-
jlis (national assembly), the Assembly of 
Experts and municipal councils. Supreme 
Leader Ali Khamenei has called these 
elections “one of the Islamic regime’s 
main pillars, a symbol of political maturity, 
and a national pride.” But none of these 
elections can claim to have been a mani-
festation of real participatory democracy, 
for several reasons. To begin with, none 
has been deemed totally free and fair, and 
every one has been tarnished by reports of 
fraud and irregularities. Some, like Presi-
dent Ahmadinejad’s reelection in 2009, 
have been widely contested and were 
followed by massive street demonstrations 
and popular protests. 
 Furthermore, none of these elections 
can pass the test of true popular represen-
tation: the people’s free choice.  By law, 
candidates for any elective office in Iran 
must be individually screened and ap-
proved before election campaigns by a 
special 12-member Council of Guardians, 
a cornerstone of the Islamic Republic.  A 
quintessential qualification for candidacy, 
among others, is a “demonstrable loyalty” 
(eltezam-e amali) to the concept of rule 
by an Islamic jurist (velayat-e faqih). The 
Council can, and frequently does, reject 
candidates’ eligibility on this and other 
vague grounds. Thus, in a Soviet-like 
procedure, only loyal candidates (khodi) 
are eligible to run, and all others (geir 
khodi) are excluded.  In some elections 
(March 2012, for example), members and 
affiliates of several political parties, along 
with 2,700 out of nearly 5,000 registered 
candidates were not allowed to participate.
Majlis candidates (except the incumbents) 
must also possess a master’s degree from 
a domestic or foreign university. Depu-
ties have no immunity from prosecution 
and can be hauled before the courts. And, 
according to a law recently passed, duly 
elected deputies can be expelled from the 
assembly during their terms of office if 
found disloyal to the concept of velayat. 
 In addition, democracy is not just 
a political structure: it has its cultural, 
social and economic dimensions. A true 
democracy, in addition to having free 
and fair elections, requires (a) respect for 
certain universal values (such as basic 
civil rights); (b) certain institutions (a 
free press, active political parties, non-
governmental organizations, trade unions, 
professional associations and similar civil 
entities); and (c) the rule of law and an 
independent judiciary as the ultimate guar-
antors of democratic rule.
 The Iranian record on the first prereq-
uisite is clearly dismal. As shown by the 
ninth consecutive annual censure resolu-
tion by the UN General Assembly since 
2003 and periodic reports by the United 
States and other Western countries, Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International, 
basic human rights are routinely and fla-
grantly violated by the Islamic Republic.  
Individual daily lives are strictly regiment-
ed; personal freedoms (choice of food, 
clothing, entertainment and recreation) 
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total ruin.”  Manned by a group of incom-
petent and often corrupt political hacks 
with little or no background in law, the 
regular and “revolutionary” Islamic courts 
are charged with the implementation of a 
seventh-century-type penal code.  These 
courts regu-
larly mete out 
barbaric pen-
alties (ston-
ing to death, 
blinding, 
amputations 
and public 
flogging) and 
the world’s 
highest per 
capita number of executions. The latest 
annual report of the World Justice Project, 
measuring respect for the law and citizens 
rights, places Iran at the very bottom of the 
100 countries observed.
(2) Iran’s “Islamic democracy” could 
be a suitable model for newly triumphal 
Islamic parties in such countries as 
Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt. 
 This is both erroneous and wrong-
headed. The Islamic Republic’s apolo-
gists at home and abroad, feeling self-
conscious about the incongruity between 
their “democratic” system and a typical 
Western variety, have propagated the fic-
tion that their “Islamic model” is an ideal 
form of government because it is headed 
by an eminent theologian — a man of God 
selected by his peers, who themselves are 
elected by popular vote.
 There are two flaws in this bizarre 
claim.  First, whether or not God’s govern-
ment on earth is superior to man’s rule, 
the term “Islamic democracy” is self-con-
tradictory and oxymoronic. Democracy, 
as its Greek origin signifies, is rule by the 
are all controlled. Dissenting journalists, 
student activists and defendants’ lawyers 
are arrested on trumped-up charges. False 
confessions are extracted under torture and 
presented to Stalinist-type courts to obtain 
long prison sentences.  Members of non-
Shia faiths 
and other 
minorities are 
routinely mis-
treated. Iran’s 
economic-
freedom 
rank in the 
2012 report 
by Freedom 
House is 171 
out of 179 countries.  In political freedom 
and respect for human rights, it scores 
seventh, the lowest position in a seven-
category scale.
 The second prerequisite of a func-
tioning democracy, the vitality of civil 
society, is also lacking in Iran. The press 
is censored. The Islamic Republic’s rank 
in press freedom, according to the 2012 
report by the Reporters Sans Frontières, 
is 175 out of 179 listed. The New York-
based Committee to Protect Journalists 
describes Iran as the jailers of the highest 
numbers of press reporters in the world, 
with 42 behind bars in December 2011. 
Radio and television are state monopo-
lies. Connections through Internet, Face-
book, Twitter and other social media are 
frequently jammed. Political parties are 
tightly regulated. Trade unions are banned. 
Lay professional associations are stigma-
tized. Nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) are selectively allowed to operate.
 Third, a competent and independent 
judiciary, as the ultimate safeguard of 
democracy, is conspicuous by its absence 
and is described by its previous chief as “a 
A prominent theoretician of the regime 
claims that the Iranian system should 
be called the government of “Islamic 
Justice,” a term he claims Ayatollah 
Khomeini preferred over “Islamic 
Republic,” which he grudgingly accepted 
only as a matter of expediency.
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nated” and “selected” by God himself and 
only “discovered” by the Islamic theolo-
gians of the Experts Assembly.
 In any event, none of the assembly 
members is actually a free agent; by law 
they all must first be screened and ap-
proved by the 12-member Council of 
Guardians.  The Council itself, however, 
consists of six theologians appointed by 
the supreme leader, and six lay jurists 
selected by the Majlis from a list of nomi-
nees submitted by the judiciary chief. The 
chief justice is himself appointed by the 
supreme leader and is naturally expected 
to select nominees loyal to the rahbar. The 
Majlis deputies, who are supposed to select 
the council’s lay members from among the 
judiciary chief’s nominees, are themselves 
all screened and approved by the Council 
of Guardians and loyal to the rahbar. Thus, 
in a near-magical manner, the supreme 
leader appoints himself to the post!
 As a further manifestation of this 
incestuous political process, some mem-
bers of the Council of Guardians also serve 
in the Assembly of Experts. Nearly all 
members of the assembly are Friday prayer 
imams appointed by the rahbar, or they 
are the latter’s representatives in various 
public organizations. Another example of 
the assembly election farce is that, in some 
precincts, there is only one candidate, no 
contestant and an outcome that is known 
beforehand. There is no time limit for the 
rahbar’s tenure.  Members of the Assembly 
of Experts are supposed to supervise his 
performance and remove him from office 
in case of incapacity or poor performance.  
But they usually meet twice a year and 
routinely issue endorsing proclamations. 
It is highly doubtful whether the recently 
triumphant Muslim people of North Africa 
would crave such a template.
 
people. Religion can never be a vehicle 
for democracy.  There is no religion based 
on democratic rule. Islam, like all other 
religions, is based on faith; democracy is 
based on a social contract. Democracy is 
composed of citizens regardless of their 
faith; Islam is composed of believers 
regardless of their citizenship.  Islamic 
sharia is the reflection God’s rule on earth 
as prescribed by the Quran. The first and 
second clauses of Iran’s 1979 constitution 
describe the regime as the manifestation of 
God’s rule on earth. The state is headed by 
a vali-e faqih, who leads the country on be-
half of the occult (hidden), Twelfth Imam. 
His orders (hokm-e hokumati), based on 
his understanding of Quranic principles, 
must be obeyed by every citizen, even if 
opposed by the majority.  The people’s 
wishes and votes would be respected only 
so long as they remain within the sharia’s 
mandates and the vali’s edicts. God’s 
incontestable rules can never be remanded 
by the people’s fickle votes, even by a 99 
percent majority. A prominent theoreti-
cian of the regime claims that the Iranian 
system should be called the government of 
“Islamic Justice,” a term he claims Aya-
tollah Khomeini preferred over “Islamic 
Republic,” which he grudgingly accepted 
only as a matter of expediency.   
 Second, whether or not the ruler’s 
access to power through popular vote is 
superior to other selective techniques, the 
matter does not apply in the case of Iran.  
True enough, the 86-member Assembly of 
Experts (all male clerics), which selects the 
vali (supreme leader, or rahbar) is elected 
periodically by direct popular vote. But 
this selection is currently a matter of de-
bate. A recent interpretation by one of the 
rahbar’s own favorite theologians claims 
that Iran’s supreme leader is in fact “desig-
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 Within the political hierarchy, he is 
the titular head of state and commander-
in-chief of the armed forces. But Iran does 
not have one-man rule. And his powers are 
not unlimited; they are specifically defined 
by the Islamic Republic’s constitution. He 
is equal to other citizens before the law 
and can be removed from office in cases of 
incapacitation or loss of essential qualifi-
cations. A clear testimony to his limited 
power is provided by a speech he delivered 
in mid-October 2011: “Leaders of Iran’s 
executive branch, the Majlis, and the judi-
ciary, in the fulfillment of their duties, may 
take certain decisions which the rahbar 
may not like.  But the rahbar has neither 
the right nor the power to interfere with 
those decisions unless the matter involves 
derailing the Islamic revolution.”
 As a protector and promoter of the 
Islamic revolution, he uses all his wits 
and wisdom in a delicate balancing act 
by keeping various power centers in tow. 
Having appointed a veterinarian with no 
military background as the chairman of the 
joint chiefs of staff, he maintains a watch-
ful eye on the armed forces. By frequently 
changing commanders of the regular armed 
services (without cutting their salaries or 
perks), he clearly tries to ward off possible 
challenges from the military. By allowing 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(pasdaran) to obtain an increasing chunk 
of lucrative development projects in no-bid 
contracts, he is seeking their total loyalty. 
And, by recruiting thousands of teen-age 
villagers and unemployed vigilantes into an 
informal militia (the baseej), he manages to 
keep street demonstrators subdued.
 The most formidable latent challenge 
to his authority, however, comes from the 
financially independent grand ayatollahs 
in Qom, who enjoy vast amounts of public 
(3) Supreme Leader Seyyed Ali 
Khamenei is one of the world’s last 
remaining dictators and has unchecked 
religious and political power over all 
Iranian affairs.            
 A popular American magazine not 
long ago portrayed Iran’s supreme leader 
as one of the world’s 10 remaining dicta-
tors. Another business periodical has re-
cently found him among the world’s most 
powerful leaders. This is not only over-
weening hyperbole, it is essentially untrue. 
While some regime-financed clerics and 
sycophantic bureaucrats may call Ayatol-
lah Khamenei the chosen emissary of the 
Prophet Mohammad on earth, he is neither 
a supreme religious authority nor a politi-
cal dictator. In the unwritten Shiite hierar-
chy, he is a mid-level clergyman (hojat-ol 
Islam) whose title of “ayatollah” was not 
acquired through proper clerical proce-
dures (writing a resale, or thesis).  It was 
bestowed on him by lay politicians when 
he was elected supreme leader in 1989 
after Ayatollah Khomeni’s death.  He may 
be regarded as a marja (source of emula-
tion) by the poor on the state dole, and he 
may aspire to be the leader of the Muslim 
world, but he is generally dismissed by 
grand ayatollahs in Qom and Najaf as a 
lightweight. He occasionally issues incon-
sequential fatwas (religious edicts) against 
wearing ties, teaching music, consuming 
gold-plated ice-cream or misusing Face-
book. But they are generally ridiculed and 
ignored.  He also uses the bully pulpit to 
issue annual proclamations such as the 
speedy privatization of state industries, 
crusades against corruption, efforts to-
wards food self-sufficiency and doubling 
the national output through an economic 
jihad. But these exhortations have so far 
remained ignored and unfulfilled.
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questioned.  But he is neither delusional 
nor crazy — as many in the West believe.  
He is a shrewd, street-wise and seasoned 
politician whose words and gestures, even 
those deliberately false or misleading, are 
carefully chosen to achieve specific objec-
tives. He is a self-adulating and authoritar-
ian leader, a demagogue masquerading as 
a populist, but he is not naïve. He may be 
the devout 
Muslim he 
pretends to 
be, but he is 
far from a 
clergy wor-
shipper. In 
fact, his “lib-
eral” position on certain hot-button issues 
— overlooking violations of the Islamic 
dress code, allowing women to attend 
sports events, kissing the hands of his old 
female school teacher, giving interviews to 
foreign female reporters without full head 
cover, expressing pride in Iran’s pre-Islam-
ic history, and rejecting gender segregation 
in the Iranian universities — attest to his 
departures from clerical orthodoxy.
 For these reasons, it is widely sus-
pected that his entire twelfth-imam sce-
nario is nothing but a clever ruse.  It is 
believed that his expectation of the imam’s 
imminent return, hints about having direct 
access to him, and claims of benefiting 
from his daily guidance on government af-
fairs are all masterfully designed to clip the 
clergy’s wings, if not implicitly question 
the sanctity of the valayat-e-faqih itself. 
For, in a situation where the country’s 
daily public policies are specifically di-
rected and supervised by the occult imam 
himself, there would hardly be need for a 
proxy, be it a vali or a rahbar.
 In the matter of hostility toward Wash-
ington, too, Ahmadinejad’s role is largely 
respect and support. They are a potent 
force that he has been trying to win over, 
time and time again, by his frequent trips 
to the city.
 As a person, Khamenei is a cautious 
and calculating man, a master of balancing 
acts who protects his power and prestige 
by avoiding involvement in controversial 
issues and factional politics by appoint-
ing special 
commissions 
to resolve 
disputes. In 
reality, he 
presides over 
several politi-
cal satrapies 
manned by various oligarchs. In this power-
sharing, semi-sanctioned anarchy, tolerated 
conflicts abound: statutes duly enacted by 
the Majlis are ignored by the executive 
branch; decrees passed by the Council of 
Ministers are found unlawful by the Majlis; 
the Supreme Audit Court finds gross viola-
tions of budgetary appropriations. Yet no 
one seems to mind. And the show goes on 
under the rahbar’s watchful eyes.   
 Unlike Machiavelli’s ideal prince, 
Khamenei is neither widely respected nor 
truly feared. He is routinely obeyed by all 
because he has convinced other oligarchs 
that, in any shake-up, they would all come 
out losers.
(4) President Mahmood Ahmadinejad is 
a religious fanatic who truly believes in 
the imminent return of the twelfth Shia 
imam (mahdi), while posing as the main 
obstacle to a Tehran-Washington détente.
 Ahmadinejad has a reputation for 
delivering crowd-pleasing and combative 
speeches full of bravado, falsehood and oc-
casional vulgarity. His personal and mana-
gerial qualifications for the office may be 
[Ahmadinejad’s] verbal assaults on 
Washington and Tel Aviv are nothing 
more than a parroting of Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s numerous 1980s sermons; 
they are not his own constructs.
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Ahmadinejad’s political enemies in order 
to nullify his pro-American démarche.
 The deadlock in Tehran-Washington 
relations goes far beyond personal grudges 
or preferences.  The enmity towards the 
United States has been the cornerstone of 
the Islamic regime’s identity, legitimacy 
and staying power from day one. It has 
been based on Ayatollah Khomeini’s xe-
nophobic posture and opposition to Mo-
hammad Reza Shah, whom he accused of 
promoting American and Israeli interests. 
Ayatollah Khamenei’s well-guarded leftist 
tendency, his unwavering championship of 
the Palestinian cause (sporting a kaffieh in 
public appearances) and hostility toward 
the Jewish state (objection to the two-state 
solution) follow the same line.  The rah-
bar’s need for a bogeyman to be blamed for 
Iran’s various setbacks as well as his own 
numerous failings may also have found 
hostility to Washington a perfect ploy.  
 In addition to this deep-rooted in-
dividual hostility, a major force behind 
continued enmity toward Washington ema-
nates from the ultra-conservative clerical 
establishment, which sees the resumption 
of relations as the end of its hegemonic 
clout.  Normal relations with Washington 
are seen by the obscurantist mullahs as the 
prelude to the so-called “Western cultural 
onslaught” — increasing political and 
social liberalization, rejection of outmoded 
Islamic moral codes, a welcome adoption 
of Western democratic institutions and 
replacement of voodoo by modern science.
 Normalization of relations with the 
United States is resisted by yet another 
powerful interest group in both the bazaar 
and the modern economy. Formed during 
the last 33 years of American absence, the 
group includes merchants, industrialists, 
service contractors and others who shifted 
their trade and business from the United 
misunderstood.  His regular anti-capitalist 
diatribes and grandstanding against the 
United States may give the impression of 
a personal anti-Americanism. But this has 
been merely an act. His oft-quoted bel-
licose statements about “wiping Israel off 
the map” and his denial of the Holocaust 
may have also seemed an obstacle to rec-
onciliation with the United States. This has 
hardly been the case, however. His verbal 
assaults on Washington and Tel Aviv are 
nothing more than a parroting of Ayatol-
lah Khomeini’s numerous 1980s sermons; 
they are not his own constructs. In fact, 
among Iran’s current political leaders, he 
is probably the most eager closet advocate 
of resuming diplomatic relations with the 
Great Satan. 
 Ahmadinejad’s actions in this re-
gard betray his narrative.  He is the only 
president of the Islamic Republic who has 
congratulated an American president on 
an election victory. He has written let-
ters to both Presidents George W. Bush 
and Barack Obama proposing a dialogue.  
In his annual trips to New York for the 
UN General Assembly, he has repeatedly 
asked to meet with U.S. leaders, to no 
avail. During his last trip, in September 
2011, he welcomed the establishment of 
a hotline between Iranian and American 
naval units in the Persian Gulf in order to 
avoid unintended mishaps.  And his many 
suggestions for solving Iran’s uranium-
enrichment and nuclear-development 
programs have been the most conciliatory 
of any Iranian leader. His revered guru, 
best friend and close relative, Esfandiar 
Moshai, is rumored to have been making 
behind-the-scenes contacts everywhere 
to advance his reconciliation objective. 
Interestingly enough, the alleged plot to 
assassinate the Saudi envoy in Washing-
ton is rumored to have been hatched by 
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international measures. Annual economic 
growth has been slowed and is currently 
hovering around 2.5-3.0 percent. Official 
inflation is over 20 percent, and the unem-
ployment rate is in the mid-teens. Private 
estimates are much higher in both cases. 
Capital, labor and total-factor productivity 
are dismally small, in some cases negative. 
The climate for investment and business is 
poor, and there is rampant corruption at all 
levels of the government and in state enter-
prises, largely intensified by sanctions. 
 Thus, there is no doubt that the cho-
reographed, multifaceted sanctions — by 
the United Nations, the U.S. Congress, the 
European Union and other countries — in-
cluding freez-
ing the assets 
and banning 
the travel 
of hundreds 
of Iranian 
individuals 
and busi-
nesses linked 
to Iran’s 
nuclear pro-
gram — have had devastating effects. By 
all evidence, the Islamic Republic today 
is economically weaker and more chaotic, 
diplomatically more isolated and alto-
gether more vulnerable than before.  After 
having categorically denied year after year 
that sanctions were having any effect on 
the Iranian economy, President Ahma-
dinejad has recently admitted that sanc-
tions had virtually paralyzed the country’s 
banking system, and called them economic 
warfare. Scattered private reports point to 
such variegated sanctions-induced setbacks 
as a notable decline in daily oil production 
due to a lack of gas injection; a 20-30 per-
cent increase in import costs due to higher 
banking, insurance and shipping charges; 
States to China, Russia, East Asia, Latin 
America and Africa. They are likely to lose 
to new American rivals. Prominent among 
potential losers would be the Islamic Revo-
lutionary Guard Corps, which currently 
enjoys a virtual monopoly in bidding for 
lucrative projects, and other Guard units 
widely suspected of being engaged in the 
increased smuggling of American products.
 
(5) Global economic sanctions have 
been to no avail since they have failed to 
change the regime’s behavior or stop its 
nuclear program.         
 There is no dispute that, during the 
long period under sanctions, Iran has not 
only refused 
to stop its 
uranium 
enrichment 
program as 
demanded, 
but defiantly 
proceeded to 
develop more 
advanced 
centrifuge 
capabilities. Furthermore, Tehran has 
accelerated enrichment of its uranium 
stockpile to 20 percent and has continued 
research on nuclear-warhead design.  Yet 
all available evidence shows that increas-
ing economic sanctions, cyber war, a terror 
campaign and a sabotage program (e.g., 
the suspicious killing of Iranian scientists, 
explosions in atomic and ballistic rocket 
centers, fires in oil and gas pipelines) have 
not only slowed down Iran’s nuclear pro-
gram, but extracted a heavy toll from the 
Iranian economy. 
 Long suffering from certain basic 
structural problems (gross mismanagement 
and ineffective leadership), Iran’s economy 
has been further damaged by punitive 
After having categorically denied year 
after year that sanctions were having any 
effect on the Iranian economy, President 
Ahmadinejad has recently admitted that 
sanctions had virtually paralyzed the 
country’s banking system, and called 
them economic warfare.
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a shift from higher-quality Western goods 
to cheaper Chinese substitutes; difficulties 
in opening letters of credit and transfers 
of funds in almost all major international 
banks; virtual stoppage of Western direct 
investments and technology transfers; 
the near-impossibility of issuing foreign-
exchange bonds in financial markets; and 
highly disturbing gyrations in the domestic 
gold and foreign-exchange markets. 
 The absence of change in the regime’s 
behavior should be thus attributed to three 
countervailing factors.  First, Iran’s pursuit 
of advanced nuclear technologies, as well 
as its development of various nuclear ca-
pabilities, has now become a matter of na-
tional sovereignty, scientific achievement 
and patriotic honor the denial of which is 
universally considered close to treason — 
even by the opposition.  Second, a number 
of Islamic, non-aligned, left-leaning and 
anti-American countries, along with such 
veto-empowered governments as Rus-
sia and China, have refused to abide by 
tougher Washington and European sanc-
tions and thus eased the burden. Cooperat-
ing banks and amenable oil refineries in 
friendly countries also helped fill some 
of the void. Third, large receipts from oil, 
gas and other exports during the last six 
years have enabled the regime to finance 
its annual budget, triple non-oil exports, 
double imports, and carry out a costly 
subsidy-reform program, thus lightening 
the sanctions’ effects.
 “Crippling” sanctions involving Iran’s 
central bank and oil exports have recently 
been imposed on Iran by the United States 
and the European Union, avowedly in 
the hope of building public discontent 
and compelling the regime to change its 
nuclear policy. But, as long as the same 
political and economic realities prevail, 
little or no palpable change in the govern-
ment’s behavior should be expected. With 
an estimated $135 billion from oil and 
non-oil exports in 2011-12, a chest reserve 
of $120 billion in cash and 907 tons of 
gold (as reported by the Tehran Chamber 
of Commerce), Iran has more than enough 
resources to meet its payment obligations 
for more than a year.  The government has 
a relatively small and serviceable foreign 
debt. And Iran can expect a continued 
positive trade balance as long as crude-
oil prices remain above $80 per barrel.  
Smuggling in and out of the country may 
also continue to play a significant role in 
easing the burden. Nevertheless, dark and 
stormy days for the economy are ahead. 
Some moderately positive reports about 
the Iranian economy from the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 
recent months, while clearly attesting to 
the economy’s resilience, also confirm an 
eighteenth-century sage’s dictum that “na-
tions have untold capacity for ruin.” 
(6) The only way to stop Iran from 
acquiring the nuclear bomb is to bomb it. 
 This is a deceptive, futile and dan-
gerous idea backed by some powerful 
political groups of ultraconservatives in 
the United States and Israel.  The hawks’ 
arguments for a preventive strike are fairly 
simple, if not very convincing. First, the 
Islamic Republic is determined to acquire 
nuclear weapons because (a) all its major 
neighbors (Russia, Israel, Pakistan and, 
by proxy, the United States) are already 
nuclear powers; (b) no country possessing 
an atomic bomb has ever been attacked;  
(c) the Tehran government cannot finan-
cially afford to match its adversaries in 
conventional weapons; (d) Tehran has pub-
licly announced its uranium-enrichment 
capabilities to be up to 20 percent, thus 
becoming a “virtual” nuclear state; and  
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and dangerous nuclear fallout. Invading 
planes could be shot down and their crews 
taken prisoner. Iran could close the Strait 
of Hormuz, sending oil prices sky high and 
damaging the global economy. American 
and allied ships and installations in the 
Persian Gulf could be attacked. In short, 
there could be no “clean and calibrated” air 
strikes, but a violent and messy affair with 
untold consequences. New insurgencies in 
Iraq and Afghanistan could be instigated. 
An American or Israeli attack on Iranian 
sites is also bound to trigger a catastrophic 
regional war involving the Lebanese Hez-
bollah, Palestinian Hamas, Syria, Saudi 
Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Coun-
cil members.
 On top of all these, even the successful 
bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities with 
bunker-busting shells might temporarily 
cripple the nuclear program, but it will not 
stop it. In fact, it may unify the opposi-
tion behind the government and encourage 
the Tehran regime to redouble its nuclear 
efforts. Installations may be destroyed, but 
knowledge cannot be wiped out of scien-
tists’ minds.
 Third, and most significant, the Iranian 
clergy’s alleged character traits are grossly 
misunderstood. The concept of the “here-
after-fixated mullahs” is a complete fiction. 
A cursory look at the ruling clergy’s mode 
of living in Iran — multiple wives, spa-
cious living quarters, luxury cars, foreign 
bank accounts, sumptuous wedding and 
anniversary parties for their offspring — 
attests to their love for life and fear of 
death.  Shiite clerics in Iran may reject 
certain aspects of Western culture, but they 
are hardly suicidal.
 In many experts’ views, a deterrence 
policy is probably the most cost-effective 
way to deal with the situation.
(e) the November 2011 report by the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
has showed that Tehran is involved in “ef-
forts to master the technology needed for 
atomic weapons” and is not forthcoming in 
its various nuclear-development activities.   
 A nuclear-armed Iran, in the neo-
con view, should thus not be allowed to 
proceed: because (1) it would lead to an 
arms race and nuclear proliferation in the 
region; (2) it would immensely increase 
Tehran’s prestige in the Middle East, and 
enable it to use the nuclear umbrella to 
establish its regional hegemony, forcing 
smaller countries into its orbit; and (3) it 
would pose an existential threat to the state 
of Israel. At the same time, preemptive-
strike proponents argue that the U.S. Cold 
War policy of containment/deterrence vis-
à-vis the Soviet Union and China would 
not stop the Islamic Republic from using 
its nuclear weapons. Their reasoning: the 
Iranian regime is shaped by a messianic 
cult and run by fanatical mullahs who 
place the highest value on martyrdom and 
life in the hereafter, thus making annihila-
tion a welcome event!
 The flaws in these arguments are 
many. First, they ignore Tehran’s repeated 
and emphatic denials and fatwas issued 
by Ayatollah Khomeini and other grand 
ayatollahs against nuclear use. Second, 
even if Iran were actually engaged in 
developing a nuclear device, bombing 
Iran’s nuclear facilities would be neither 
practical nor effective, as several high-
ranking American and Israeli authorities 
have repeatedly pointed out. Iran is not 
Iraq or Syria with a fixed, open and known 
nuclear facility and no possibility of retali-
ation. Bombing multiple Iranian sites near 
population centers would require many air 
sorties, causing heavy human casualties 
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leaders did not push for the theocracy’s 
downfall. They wanted, in fact, to go back 
to Ayatollah Khomeini’s “golden era,” his 
“true teachings” and a strict observance of 
Iran’s Islamic constitution. 
 The much later demonstrations in 
Iran during 2010 — which involved 
faint chants against the rahbar and scat-
tered stifled 
demands for 
Khamenei’s 
ouster — 
have them-
selves, ironi-
cally, been 
influenced 
by the Arab 
Spring, rather 
than the reverse. The new anti-rahbar cries 
started after Ben Ali’s ouster in Tunisia 
and Mubarak’s in Egypt.
Avoidable Pitfalls
 The distorted picture that these 
myths present goes beyond mere abstrac-
tions. The myth of a popularly elected 
government in Iran and the fiction of an 
“Islamic democracy” propagated by the 
regime’s mouthpieces around the world 
have enabled the Islamic Republic, one 
of the world’s most notorious misogynist 
regimes, to gain a seat at the UN Commis-
sion on the Status of Women, the princi-
pal world body dedicated exclusively to 
gender equality. 
 The exaggerated notion about Ayatol-
lah Khamenei’s absolute power and unique 
prestige has deflected attention from the 
fact that, since the end of the Iran-Iraq 
War, Iran has been steadily moving from a 
theocratic oligarchy towards a quasi mili-
tary dictatorship in which the top brass, 
masquerading as devout Muslims, enjoy 
not only increasing political clout but also 
(7) Iran’s massive pro-democracy 
demonstrations of 2009 — the Green 
Movement — have been the main 
inspiration for the uprisings in the Arab 
world, the so-called Arab Spring.
 This connection seems highly far-
fetched, for several reasons.  First, the 
lapse of time between Tehran’s June 2009 
street demon-
strations and 
the first spark 
in the Tuni-
sian uprising 
in December 
2010 makes 
the events too 
distant from 
one another 
to be correlated.  Second, the nature of the 
riots, the protesters’ demands and the dy-
namics of the discourse have been vastly 
different in the two cases.  In Tunisia, 
as in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain and 
Yemen, grievances were about dictato-
rial regimes that had resulted in mass 
unemployment, high inflation, rampant 
corruption and rising poverty. In Iran, the 
complaints focused solely on the rigged 
presidential elections and “lost votes.”  
Similarly, the demonstrators’ demand in 
the Arab world was straightforward: the 
ouster of the long-ruling dictators.  In 
Iran, there was no demand for regime 
change or the supreme leader’s dismissal. 
Third, the Arab uprisings were generally 
leaderless and sprang almost spontaneous-
ly from the frustrated, aggrieved and un-
employed youth seeking a better material 
life. In Iran, the “Green Movement” was 
backed by two aging former officials and 
solid members of the Islamic Regime’s 
nomenklatura who were deeply and per-
sonally involved in some of the regime’s 
questionable deeds.  These “opposition” 
“Opposition” leaders did not push for the 
theocracy’s downfall. They wanted, in 
fact, to go back to Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
“golden era,” his “true teachings” and 
a strict observance of Iran’s Islamic 
constitution. 
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claimed to be unintended by the Obama 
administration — American and Israeli 
hardliners are emboldened to propose yet 
stiffer and more coercive measures. 
 The fiction concerning Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions has complicated Iran’s normal 
relations with its neighbors and the inter-
national community at large. It has led 
the hawks to get ahead of the facts and 
overplay the significance of the Islamic 
Republic’s drive for nuclear technology by 
falsely claiming that the latest IAEA report 
finds Tehran on the threshold of having a 
nuclear bomb. And the preposterous notion 
about the mullahs’ craving for martyrdom 
and defiance of mutual annihilation has 
likewise prompted the warmongers to push 
for early preventive strikes.
 Finally, the false notion about the Arab 
Spring’s emanating from Iran’s Green 
Movement has enabled the Islamic Repub-
lic’s propaganda machine to portray the 
North African uprisings as a “great Islamic 
awakening,” a “struggle against the West,” 
and a “revival of Islamic rule.” In truth, 
none of these movements has showed any 
similarity to Iran’s 1979 revolution. There 
have been no “death to America” or “death 
to Israel” slogans, no burning of the Amer-
ican flag, and no demands for an Islamic 
government. In their general yearning for 
freedom, democracy and respect for hu-
man rights, there has been a clear rejection 
of an Iranian-type Islamic rule. Interest-
ingly enough, in the UN General Assembly 
votes on Iran’s 2011 human-rights viola-
tions, Tunisia and Libya voted against the 
Islamic Republic, and Egypt abstained.
 A clearer understanding of these 
myths may not end the West’s Iranian 
conundrum, but it might lead to less 
swashbuckling and more effective ways of 
dealing with it.  
growing financial power — with dire con-
sequences for the country and the region.
 The myth about President Ahmadine-
jad being responsible for the Tehran-Wash-
ington rupture has camouflaged the real 
stumbling blocks. The reason Ayatollah 
Khamenei and other top political leaders 
have been reluctant to engage in a serious 
dialogue with Washington is not essentially 
a clash of personalities or hostility toward 
a grand bargain, but simply a matter of pro-
found mistrust. In March 2010 Ayatollah 
Khamenei rejected President Obama’s “ex-
tended hand” (of friendship) by calling it a 
“steel hand inside a velvet glove.” Rightly 
or not, Iran’s political leaders are con-
vinced that Washington’s ultimate objective 
regarding Iran is “regime change,” and 
that all the talk about nuclear weapons or 
human-rights abuses is sheer political sub-
terfuge. A recent newspaper report, attrib-
uted to an unnamed Washington official, 
indicates that the sanctions are designed to 
create enough popular discontent to force a 
change.  Thus, unless and until the Iranian 
leaders are disabused of this notion, there 
will be no gesture of reconciliation from 
the Iranian side.  At the same time, given 
the current make-up of the U.S. Congress 
and the domination of U.S. politics by 
special-interest pressure groups, Tehran’s 
overt and unrelenting hostility towards the 
state of Israel, as well as its undisguised 
opposition to the two-state solution, will 
prevent Washington from considering any 
genuine détente with Tehran.       
 The illusion about the futility of sanc-
tions has played into the hands of those 
who advocate “neutralizing” the Iranian 
nuclear threat rather than containing it. 
Ignoring the devastating effects of sanc-
tions and coercive measures on ordinary 
Iranian citizens — consequences explicitly 
